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NOTE
Automatic Consumer Protection Act Recovery
For Lack Of Informed Consent:
Quimby v. Fine
I. INTRODUCTION
In Quimby v. Fine,' the Washington Court of Appeals,
Division I, ruled for the first time "that [a] lack of informed
consent claim2 against a health care provider may be within
the scope of the Consumer Protection Act,3 if it relates to the
entrepreneurial aspect of the medical practice."4 The court
noted that "whether [defendant's] conduct meets the other
prongs [sic]5 of the Hangman6 test is a question of fact to be
resolved at the trial level."7 But the court apparently failed to
recognize the parallel structures of the informed consent stat-
ute8 and the test articulated in Hangman Ridge Training Sta-
1. 45 Wash. App. 175, 724 P.2d 403 (1986), reconsideration denied, review denied,
107 Wash. 2d 1032 (1987).
2. A lack of informed consent claim is based on a violation of WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.70.050 (1987). See irfra note 8.
3. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 19.86 (1987).
4. 45 Wash. App. at 181, 724 P.2d at 406 (emphasis added).
5. "Entrepreneurial aspects" is not a prong of the Hangman test. See infra note
49 and accompanying text.
6. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778,
719 P.2d 531 (1986). See infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
7. 45 Wash. App. at 182, 724 P.2d at 406.
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (1987). This statute provides:
Failure to secure informed consent-Necessary elements of proof-
Emergency situations:
(1) The following shall be necessary elements of proof that injury
resulted from health care in a civil negligence case or arbitration involving the
issue of the alleged breach of duty to secure informed consent by a patient or
his representatives against a health care provider:
(a) That the health care provider failed to inform the patient of a
material fact or facts relating to the treatment;
(b) That the patient consented to the treatment without being aware of
or fully informed of such material fact or facts;
(c) That a reasonably prudent patient under similar circumstances would
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bles v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. for a "private dispute"9 under the
Consumer Protection Act.' ° This parallelism effectively forces
the conclusion that a plaintiff who establishes the elements of
his lack-of-informed-consent action has also satisfied the ele-
ments of private Consumer Protection Act action.
In addition, the requirement that the lack of informed
consent "relate" to the "entrepreneurial aspects" of the medi-
cal practice is inherently problematic. First, the standard is
difficult to interpret. Second, virtually every lack-of-informed-
consent action will fall within the purview of the Consumer
Protection Act automatically. By providing a test that does
not differentiate claims, the court has given no guidance con-
cerning the rightful application of the punitive aspects of the
Consumer Protection Act. This guidance is necessary if the
Consumer Protection Act is to achieve its dual purposes of pro-
tecting the public and fostering fair and honest competition."
As it stands, the test announced by the Quimby court will
grant Consumer Protection Act damages for merely negligent
failure to obtain informed consent. These damages should be
available only when the health care provider profits because he
failed to obtain informed consent.
not have consented to the treatment if informed of such material fact or facts;
(d) That the treatment in question proximately caused injury to the
patient.
(2) Under the provisions of this section a fact is defined as or considered
to be a material fact, if a reasonably prudent person in the position of the
patient or his representative would attach significance to it deciding whether
or not to submit to the proposed treatment.
(3) Material facts under the provision of this section which must be
established by expert testimony shall be either:
(a) The nature and character of the treatment proposed and
administered;
(b) The anticipated results of the treatment proposed and administered;
(c) The recognized possible alternative forms of treatment; or
(d) The recognized serious possible risks, complications, and anticipated
benefits involved in the treatment administered and in the recognized possible
alternative forms of treatment, including non treatment.
(4) If a recognized health care emergency exists and the patient is not
legally competent to give an informed consent and/or a person legally
authorized to consent on behalf of the patient is not readily available, his
consent to required treatment will be implied.
9. See infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
10. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 19.86 (1987).
11. Id. § 19.86.920. In fact, adherence to the implied result of Quimby defeats
these announced purposes. First, the public loses protection because doctors will be
more hesitant to provide services with the increased potential for liability. Second, fair
and honest competition cannot be promoted by a rule that effectively forces physicians
to limit practice.
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This Note will demonstrate the need to refine the
entrepreneurial aspects test as it applies to medical profession-
als and suggest a rationale for identifying those lack-of-
informed-consent actions to which the Consumer Protection
Act rightfully applies. Specifically, this Note seeks to: 1)
demonstrate that satisfaction of the statutory elements of a
lack-of-informed-consent claim 2 necessarily satisfies the five
prongs of the Hangman private dispute test;13 2) show that the
additional requirement that the lack of informed consent"relate to the entrepreneurial aspects of the medical practice"
has not been definitively interpreted, and that it may be
unintelligible in context;14 3) identify the practical difficulties
of distinguishing entrepreneurial activity from professional
activity within the framework of informed consent in health
care,' 5  and suggest a plausible interpretation of the"entrepreneurial aspects test" that may aid in identifying those
types of lack-of-informed-consent actions to which the Con-
sumer Protection Act should apply;' 6 and 4) consider the poli-
cies justifying this suggested interpretation.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING OF QUIMBY V. FINE
Quimby was an appeal from a denial of defendant-physi-
cian Fine's motion for summary judgment in a wrongful birth
action. Plaintiffs' allegations included medical negligence, lack
of informed consent, and a consumer protection claim. Rose
Quimby had consented to a particular sterilization procedure.
Dr. Fine, however, performed an alternate procedure" without
advising the patient of, or obtaining her consent for, the substi-
tution.' 9 The procedure, a tubal ligation, failed. As a result,
Mrs. Quimby became pregnant and delivered an infant with
12. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 49-65.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 99-128.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 185-96.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 137-46.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 147-202.
18. The patient had consented to a Pomeroy tubal ligation, and Dr. Fine
substituted the somewhat less reliable, but also less time consuming and therefore
more economical, Hulka Clip procedure. Brief for Respondent at 1, Quimby v. Fine, 45
Wash. App. 175, 724 P.2d 403 (1986) (No. 83-2-13762-4). This tactic is reminiscent of the
classic "bait and switch" tactic used by some less reputable used-car dealers.
19. Mrs. Quimby executed a blank consent form that was later completed by Dr.
Fine. Telephone interview with Rick Ockerman, plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 5, 1988).
The patient first learned of the substitution after she became pregnant. Brief for
Respondent at 3. Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 724 P.2d 403.
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multiple birth defects. The child died eleven months later.2 °
Dr. Fine moved for summary judgment contending, inter
alia, that the Consumer Protection Act was inapplicable to
plaintiffs' causes of action because it could not apply to either
medical negligence or lack of informed consent.2 In affirming
the denial of summary judgment and remanding for trial,22 the
court re-examined the application of the Consumer Protection
20. The alleged wrongful birth of Kari Quimby occurred on August 11, 1981. The
child spent the first six months of her short life in the hospital, mostly in intensive
care. For the next five months, Mrs. Quimby attended the child's constant needs,
which included hourly feedings by eyedropper. During those five months, the plaintiff
had virtually no sleep or rest. When the child then developed a fever and was taken to
the hospital, the mother slept for 36 uninterrupted hours. On awaking she called the
hospital. After learning of her child's condition, she left the telephone number of a
friend's house where she could be reached. Relaxing for the first break from the
constant demands of the last months, she received a telephone call from the hospital
informing her of her child's death.
Ultimately, Mrs. Quimby's marriage could not withstand the stress of these and
the surrounding events and was dissolved. Telephone interview with Rick Ockerman,
plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 5, 1988).
21. 45 Wash. App. at 179, 724 P.2d at 405.
22. The trial on remand was complicated when Dr. Fine died in June, 1987, just
three days before his scheduled deposition. His death effectively shut down avenues of
discovery that could have provided evidence to support the plaintiffs' Consumer
Protection Act claim. The court would not allow examination of Dr. Fine's other
patient records because of the physician-patient privilege. The testimony of Mrs.
Maryanne Bruh, another patient of Dr. Fine who had undergone a similar substitution
of surgical procedures, lacked sufficient credibility to establish the basis for the claim.
See Brief for Respondent at 29, Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 724 P.2d 403. The
court apparently was willing to permit the claim to be established in one of two ways:
either 1) that the surgery was performed on a "profit-oriented basis", or 2) that the
procedure was a matter of "routine performance for profit," but the court was not
willing to infer either of these without supporting testimony. Telephone interview
with Rick Ockerman, plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 5, 1988).
Trial finally began in September 1987. The results were reported as follows:
Medical Malpractice
Death (Infant)
12/28/79-Plff. Rose, female age 33, Secretary. Decedent Def. doctor performed a
Holka [sic] clip sterilization on Plff. Rose; sterilization failed and Plff. Rose bore a
child (Kari) with severe defects. Plffs. [sic] contended Def. doctor never told her about
Holka [sic] clips or the failure rates of respective tubal ligations; that clips have a
substantially higher technical failure rate compared to the Pomeroy method. Def.
contended that all tubal ligations have same failure rate; that Plff. would have
followed Defendant doctor's advance [sic] and that she knew and signed consent forms
that he was using clips.
Injuries: Birth of baby girl with two-chamber heart, no spleen, abnormal liver and
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Act to the "learned profession" of law in Short v. Demopolis23
and found "no basis to distinguish the legal practice from the
medical practice" 24 in applying a consumer protection statute.
Noting that the elements of a private Consumer Protec-
tion Act claim had been enumerated in Hangman, the court
acknowledged that the requirements of the Hangman test 25
must also be satisfied. The court concluded that the Consumer
Protection Act was applicable to Mrs. Quimby's lack-of-
informed-consent claim stating that "a lack-of-informed-con-
sent claim can be based on dishonest and unfair practices used
to promote the entrepreneurial aspects of a doctor's practice,
such as when the doctor promotes an operation or service to
increase profits and the volume of patients, then fails to ade-
quately advise the patient of risks or alternative procedures. "26
To review, the holding in Short impliedly brought health
care professionals within the reach of the Consumer Protec-
tion Act. The Hangman court enumerated the elements of
such a Consumer Protection Act claim, and the Quimby court
extended Consumer Protection Act coverage to lack-of-
informed-consent claims, provided that the lack-of-informed-
consent claim relate to the entrepreneurial aspects of a medi-
cal practice.
III. SHORT V. DEMOPOLIS: THE INEVITABLE APPLICATION OF
THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT TO MEDICAL
PROFESSIONALS
The Washington Supreme Court first applied the Con-
sumer Protection Act to a learned profession in Short v. Demo-
hiatus [sic] hernia. Externally perfect but internal defects led eventually to her death
eleven months after birth.
Specials: Med. $71,351.59; Lost Wages-$1,914; Days Work Lost - 2 months; Days in
Hosp. - 2 days.
Settlement: Demand: $100,000. Piff. asked jury for $324,000. Offer: $50,000. No
settlement conference.
Result: Plaintiff Verdict for $160,000. (No new trial pending.)
1987 Jury Verdicts Northwest 556 (Nov. 1987).
Assuming a "standard" one-third contingency fee, subrogation of the recovery of
medical damages, and estimating costs at about 10% of the verdict, Rose Quimby could
have "netted" about $20,000. Had the Consumer Protection Act claim been proved, she
would have netted about $79,000 more ($10,000 treble damages, $16,000 costs, $53,000
attorneys' fees).
23. 103 Wash. 2d 52, 691 P.2d 163 (1984).
24. Quimby, 45 Wash. App. at 180, 724 P.2d at 406.
25. See infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
26. 45 Wash. App. at 181, 724 P.2d at 406.
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polis.2 7 In Short, the defendant-client counterclaimed against
plaintiff-attorney who was suing for collection of fees for legal
services rendered. Remarking that the Consumer Protection
Act contains no language expressly excluding attorneys from
its purview, the court concluded that some conduct within the
practice of law did fall within the Consumer Protection Act.
The court held that the term "conduct of any trade or com-
merce" does not exclude all conduct of the profession of law,2"
since "[w]hatever else it may be... the exchange of such a ser-
vice for money is 'commerce' in the most common usage of
that word."29 The court specifically left open the question of
whether the Consumer Protection Act applies to every aspect
of the practice of law as to the performance of legal services.3 °
By contrast, the claims amounting to allegations of negli-
gence or malpractice were held as a matter of law to be
exempt from the Consumer Protection Act.3' These claims
were "not chiefly concerned with the entrepreneurial aspects
of the legal practice; rather, they concern[ed] the actual prac-
tice of law."32 The only claims that were allowed to go forward
were those that "primarily challenge the entrepreneurial
aspects of legal practice-how the price of legal services is
determined, billed and collected and the way a law firm
27. 103 Wash. 2d 52, 691 P.2d 163 (1984). See generally Note, Recent Development:
Washington Lawyers Under the Purview of the State Consumer Protection Act: The
"Entrepreneurial Aspects" Solution, 60 WASH. L. REV. 925 (1985) [hereinafter Note,
Washington Lawyers].
28. 103 Wash. 2d at 66, 691 P.2d at 170. The court also disposed of the argument
that regulation of attorneys by the judiciary precluded application of the Consumer
Protection Act. Id. at 62-66, 691 P.2d at 169-171.
Cf. Comment, The Scope of the Regulated Industries Exemption Under the
Washington Consumer Protection Act, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 415 (1975) (after the 1974
amendment by the legislature, the burden of proof is on defendant to show that his act
or practice is specifically permitted by the appropriate regulatory body).
29. Short, 103 Wash. 2d at 57, 691 P.2d at 166 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 773 (1975)).
30. 103 Wash. 2d at 66, 691 P.2d at 170-71.
31. Id. at 61-62, 691 P.2d at 168. But see DeBakey v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631, 633
(Tex. Ct. App. 1980), affd, 612 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1981) (court noted that claims against
physicians based on negligence are specifically exempted from Texas' Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, while claims against lawyers are not).
The residual exemption has been criticized. "The court should have concluded
that all aspects of the practice of law are trade or commerce as defined by the
[Consumer Protection Act], but that certain acts, such as professional negligence, may
not be classified as "unfair or deceptive." Note, Washington Lawyers, supra note 27,
at 926.
32. 103 Wash. 2d at 61, 691 P.2d at 168 (emphasis added).
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obtains, retains, and dismisses clients."33 The court recognized
that failure to extend the Consumer Protection Act generally
to the learned professions in Washington had been criticized as
based on the "myth of the learned profession exemption to the
Consumer Protection Act."34 This criticism contributed to the
application of the Consumer Protection Act to the learned pro-
fession of law in Short.35
Commentators have approved the extension of the Con-
sumer Protection Act to the legal profession. 6 Some have
argued, however, that Short should have extended the Con-
sumer Protection Act's protection to virtually all aspects of the
professional's practice, not merely those deemed"entrepreneurial. '37  Indeed, this blanket application was sug-
gested to the Short court.3 ' But while the majority opinion in
Short left open the question of comprehensive application of
the Consumer Protection Act to the legal profession,39 a con-
curring opinion emphasized the sentiment that Short "neces-
sarily decided that the [Consumer Protection Act] does not
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. See Comment, The Washington Consumer Protection Act vs. The Learned
Professional, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 435, 438 (1975) [hereinafter Comment, Learned
Professional].
35. Short, 103 Wash. 2d at 62, 691 P.2d at 168-69 (citing Comment, Learned
Professional, supra note 34, at 436-38).
36. See generally Note, Washington Lawyers, supra note 27, at 925 n.3.
37. Id. at 937.
38. "[Djifficulty does arise in construing negligent behavior as unfair ....
Nevertheless, it is feasible and certainly preferable to employ the Act in all cases of
professional misconduct inclusive of mere negligence, for the simple reason that any
conduct which is detrimental to the public interest is unfair to the injured victim."
Comment, Learned Professional, supra note 34, at 452-53.
The Consumer Protection Act applies to the learned professional's prohibited acts,
and acts neither prohibited nor specifically permitted and that are unfair or deceptive.
Id. at 449. "[O]nly where the ultimate ramifications of the professional's act or
practice are entirely within the scope of his professional field will the 'learned
professional exemption' apply. Id. at 442-43 (latter emphasis added).
The plain definition of trade and commerce in WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.010(2)
(1987) includes "the sale of ... services . . ." and arguably contemplates the entire
spectrum of professional services, entrepreneurial or not. The court also has adopted a
definition of services:
In ordinary usage the term 'services' has a rather broad and general
meaning. It includes generally any act performed for the benefit of another
under some arrangement or agreement whereby such act was to have been
performed. The general definition of 'service' as given in Webster's New
International Dictionary is 'performance of labor for the benefit of another';
'Act or instance of helping or benefitting.'
Skrivanich v. Davis, 29 Wash. 2d 150, 161, 186 P.2d 364, 370 (1947) (quoting Cream-
eries of America v. Industrial Comm'n., 98 Utah 571, 572, 102 P.2d 300, 304 (1941)).
39. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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apply to every aspect of the practice of law in this state. 40
But the supreme court, in construing the Consumer Pro-
tection Act,4 1 followed the intent of the legislature that the
courts be guided by final decisions of the federal courts.42 The
court then cited numerous federal cases in which the "learned
professional" exception was of no avail to various health care
professions. 43 This construction effectively demolished any bar
to the application of the Consumer Protection Act to at least
some aspects of the medical profession.4 4
Other states have applied their Consumer Protection Acts
to the health care professions,4 5 and at least one court has con-
sidered whether the negligent acts of a physician are within
the scope of a Consumer Protection Act,46 but none has applied
its Consumer Protection Act to a lack-of-informed-consent
claim.
Relying on the reasoning in Short, the Quimby court
found "no basis to distinguish the legal practice from the medi-
cal practice. '47 And, like the supreme court in Short, the court
of appeals in Quimby carefully excluded plaintiff's negligence
claim from the purview of the Consumer Protection Act
"because it relates to the actual competence of the medical
practitioner."4  Although Short made the extension of the
Consumer Protection Act to the health care professions inevi-
table, the addition of a Consumer Protection Act claim to a
40. Short, 103 Wash. 2d at 71, 691 P.2d at 172.
41. "It is the intent of the legislature that, in construing this act, the courts be
guided by final decisions of the federal courts . . . interpreting the various federal
statutes dealing with the same or similar matters .... To this end this act shall be
liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be served." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.86.920 (1987).
42. Short, 103 Wash. 2d at 56, 691 P.2d at 166.
43. Id. at 58-59, 691 P.2d at 167. See also American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade
Comm'n., 638 F.2d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 1980) (the business aspects of medical practice fall
within the scope of the FTC Act even if secondary to the charitable and social aspects
of physicians' work).
44. At least with regard to antitrust violations, federal courts may have fashioned
a post-Goldfarb exemption for commercial aspects of practice. See Annotation,
"Learned Profession" Exemption in Federal Antitrust Laws 39 A.L.R. FED. 774, 781
(1978).
45. Commonwealth v. Sigafoose, 11 Pa. Commw. 565, 315 A.2d 642 (1974)
(chiropractors falsely advertising); Little v. Rosenthal, 376 Mass. 573, 382 N.E.2d 1037
(1978) (alleging unfair trade practices by a physician and nursing home).
46. DeBakey v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980).
47. 45 Wash. App. at 180, 724 P.2d at 406.
48. Id. Comparably, lack-of-informed-consent claims related to "actual com-
petence" should be excluded. The Quimby court's entrepreneurial aspects test,
however, fails to make this distinction clear.
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lack-of-informed-consent claim is troublesome because the
generic facts that support a lack-of-informed-consent claim
ostensibly satisfy the test for a private Consumer Protection
Act claim under Hangman. The result will be to increase the
amount of recovery for a lack-of-informed-consent claim by
allowing additional recovery under the Consumer Protection
Act.
IV. HANGMAN RIDGE: THE TEST FOR A PRIVATE DISPUTE
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT CLAIM
To prevail in a private Consumer Protection Act action,
the plaintiff must prove the five distinct elements or "prongs"
enumerated by the Hangman court:49 1) an unfair or deceptive
act or practice; 2) an occurrence of that act in trade or com-
merce; 3) a public interest impact; 4) an injury to the plaintiff's
business or property; and 5) a causal link between the unfair
or deceptive act complained of and the injury suffered.
In order to establish an unfair or deceptive act 50 or prac-
tice in a private dispute, it is not necessary to show that the act
in question was intended to deceive, but merely that the act
had the capacity to deceive.51 "The purpose of the capacity-to-
deceive test is to deter deceptive conduct before injury
occurs."
5 2
The term "trade or commerce" is broadly defined to
include the sale of professional service.53 "The [Consumer Pro-
tection Act], on its face, shows a carefully drafted attempt to
49. 105 Wash. 2d at 784, 719 P.2d at 535-39. For an analysis of the requirements for
a private Consumer Protection Act action prior to Hangman, see Comment, The
Consumer Protection Act Private Right of Action: A Re-Evaluation, 19 GONz. L. REV.
673 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, A Re-Evaluation].
50. In order for an act to be deceptive, it need not constitute fraud, and the
claimant need not actually be defrauded. In Fell v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960),
the court held that the Federal Trade Commission could prevent the use of deceptive
acts or practices if there was a mere likelihood that the acts might deceive; existence
of bad intent is immaterial. It would follow, then, that under the Washington
Consumer Protection Act, a professional whose acts have the capacity to deceive and
which result in some injury to his client or patient will be subject to potential liability
under the Act. Comment, Learned Professional, supra note 34, at 453.
51. 105 Wash. 2d at 785, 719 P.2d at 535. See, e.g., Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co.,
Inc., 22 Wash. App. 143, 149, 589 P.2d 283, 286 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 92 Wash.
2d 548, 599 P.2d 1271 (1979). See also Comment, Private Suits Under Washington's
Consumer Protection Act: The Public Interest Requirement, 54 WASH. L. REV. 795, 807
n.87 (1979) [hereinafter Comment, Private Suits].
52. 105 Wash. 2d at 785, 719 P.2d at 535. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020
(1987).
53. Short, 103 Wash. 2d at 61, 691 P.2d at 168.
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bring within its reaches every person who conducts unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in any trade or commerce. 5 4
The public interest requirement is by far the most com-
plex of the five Hangman prongs of a private Consumer Pro-
tection Act claim. The Hangman court thinly veiled its
invitation to the legislature to remove Washington from the
minority of jurisdictions that demand a showing of public
interest in a private Consumer Protection Act claim.55 Its lan-
guage see'ms almost apologetic for being "compelled" to persist
in the requirement. 6 The court relaxed the more stringent
test it had previously applied to this element.57
Under the new standards, whether the public has an inter-
est in any given action is to be determined by the trier of fact
from several factors.58 These factors will vary according to the
context in which the act was committed. As an example of a"private dispute," the Hangman court used the attorney-client
dispute in Short.59 Noting that it is the likelihood that addi-
tional plaintiffs have been or will be injured in exactly the
54. Id. at 61, 691 P.2d at 168.
55. See Comment, On the Propriety of the Public Interest Requirement in the
Washington Consumer Protection Act, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 143, 171 (1986).
The public interest requirement has been criticized as "superfluous." Id. at 156. But
see Comment, Private Suits, supra note 51, at 807 (Washington's requirement of a
public interest serves the same purpose as the statutory requirement of intentional
violation in other states.).
56. 105 Wash. 2d at 789, 719 P.2d at 537.
57. Id. ("(T]he plaintiff need no longer meet the three prongs of this test," that is,
the "inducement-repetition-damage" test promulgated in Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wash.
2d 40, 614 P.2d 184 (1980)). See McCrae v. Bolstad, 101 Wash. 2d 161, 676 P.2d 496
(1984) in which the Anhold test was met when defendant's real estate agent failed to
disclose significant facts. Plaintiff acted in reliance, and was damaged as a result. The
Anhold test ostensibly required only potential for repetition, but the court never
established the exact meaning of "potential for repetition." See Eastlake Constr. Co. v.
Hess, 102 Wash. 2d 30, 52, 686 P.2d 465, 477 (1984) (potential for repetition must be real
and substantial and not a mere hypothetical possibility). One way to prove potential
for repetition was by proving actual repetition of injury to other consumers. Cf. Rouse
v. Glascam Builders, 101 Wash. 2d 127, 134-35, 677 P.2d 125-30 (1984) (no potential for
repetition of defendant condominium builder's unfair acts to one owner when there
was no proof of unfair acts to any other owner in a common development). The
potential could also be proved by showing that the defendant engaged in a protracted
course of unfair or deceptive conduct. See, e.g., Eastlake, 102 Wash. 2d at 52, 686 P.2d
at 477. Potential could be shown by showing that defendant used widespread
advertising. See, e.g., Luxon v. Caviezel, 42 Wash. App. 261, 268-69, 710 P.2d 809, 813
(1985). Neither of these latter is applicable to any but the smallest minority of
attorney/client or physician/patient transactions. Thus, in order to prove potential for
repetition, private transaction plaintiffs are forced, as a practical matter, to prove
actual repetition.
58. 105 Wash. 2d at 789-91, 719 P.2d at 537-38.
59. Id. at 790, 719 P.2d at 538.
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same manner 60 that causes a private dispute to affect the pub-
lic interest,61 the court considered the following factors: "1)
Were the alleged acts committed in the course of defendant's
business? 2) Did defendant advertise to the public in general?
3) Did defendant actively solicit this particular plaintiff, indi-
cating potential solicitation of others? and 4) Did the plaintiff
and defendant occupy unequal bargaining positions?"62
It is important to emphasize that no single factor is dispos-
itive and that not all factors must be present to satisfy the pub-
lic interest prong.63 The court left itself wide latitude to find
the presence of a "public interest" in a private dispute.
The two remaining Consumer Protection Act prongs may
be stated simply. There must be an injury to plaintiff's busi-
ness or property, but the injury need not be great.64 Finally,
there must be a "causal link" between the unfair or deceptive
act(s) and the injury suffered by the plaintiff.65
V. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY: THE ELEMENTS OF A LACK-OF-
INFORMED-CONSENT CLAIM AND THEIR CONGRUENCE
WITH THE HANGMAN PRONGS
In order to obtain an award for any cause of action for
injury resulting from health care,66 plaintiff must establish
that defendant failed to follow the accepted standard of care,
or that defendant promised the patient that the injury suffered
would not occur, or that defendant failed to obtain informed
consent.6 7 The elements of a lack-of-informed-consent claim 68
60. Mrs. Quimby offered to prove that Dr. Fine had performed substitution of the
identical procedures on Mrs. Maryanne Bruhn. Brief for Respondents at 29, Quimby v.
Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 724 P.2d 403.
61. 105 Wash. 2d at 790, 719 P.2d at 538.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 793, 719 P.2d at 539.
65. Id.
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.010 (1987) provides:
Declaration of modification of actions for damages based upon injuries
resulting from health care. The state of Washington, exercising its police and
sovereign power, hereby modifies as set forth in this chapter and in WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.16.350, as now or hereafter amended, certain substantive and
procedural aspects of all civil actions and causes of action, whether based on
tort, contract, or otherwise, for damages for injury occurring as a result of
health care which is provided after June 25, 1976.
Thus, a cause of action under the Consumer Protection Act also falls
under the provisions of this section.
(Emphasis added).
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.030 (1987) provides:
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are: 1) that defendant failed to disclose a material fact 2) of
which a reasonably prudent patient 69 was unaware 3) concern-
ing a procedure to which the patient would not have consented
had he known the fact withheld 4) that proximately caused the
injury in issue.
Each element of a lack-of-informed-consent claim must be
satisfied before the plaintiff can recover under the Consumer
Protection Act.7' But, if the lack-of-informed-consent ele-
No award shall be made in any action or arbitration for damages
occurring as the result of health care which is provided after June 25, 1976,
unless the plaintiff establishes one or more of the following propositions:
(1) That injury resulted from the failure of a health care provider to
follow the accepted standard of care;
(2) That a health care provider promised the patient or his representative
that the injury suffered would not occur;
(3) That injury resulted from health care to which the patient or his
representative did not consent.
Unless otherwise provided in this chapter, the plaintiff shall have the
burden of proving each fact essential to an award by a preponderance of the
evidence.
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (1987) provides for the following elements of a
lack-of-informed-consent action:
(a) That the health care provider failed to inform the patient of a
material fact or facts relating to treatment;
(b) That the patient consented to the treatment without being aware of
or fully informed of such material fact or facts;
(c) That a reasonably prudent patient under similar circumstances would
not have consented to the treatment if informed of such material fact or facts;
(d) That the treatment in question proximately cause injury to the
patient.
Washington has explicitly adopted the "objective patient" standard for the mate-
rial fact test. See Miller v. Washington, 11 Wash. App. 272, 289-90, 522 P.2d 852, 864
(1974), affrd per curiam, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975). If it had not done so,
Quimby would allow the patient's "subjective" 20/20 hindsight to activate the Con-
sumer Protection Act in lack-of-informed-consent actions resulting in virtual strict
liability.
69. While this "objective" test for materiality of the undisclosed risk may seem to
insulate the health care provider from the hindsight of an unreasonable plaintiff, it
nevertheless exposes the provider to the hindsight of a jury. Miller v. Kennedy, 11
Wash. App. at 288-89, 522 P.2d at 864 (1974); see also Smith v. Shannon, 100 Wash. 2d
26, 32, 666 P.2d 351, 355 (1983); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1131 (Me. 1980)
(acknowledging "potential danger that a jury, composed of laymen and gifted with the
benefit of hindsight, will define the breach of a disclosure obligation largely on the
basis of the unfortunate result"); Brown v. Dahl, 41 Wash. App. 565, 574-75, 705 P.2d
781, 788 (1985). (WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050(3)(d) (1987) does not require expert
testimony that the risks of proposed treatment be greater than risks of available
alternatives.)
70. Perhaps the most interesting question raised by Quimby is whether an
"injury" cognizable under the Consumer Protection Act, but not adequate in itself to
satisfy the statutory "injury" element of lack of informed consent will nevertheless
afford plaintiff a recovery for "injury resulting from health care." For example,
assume the Quimby facts with the following variation: Mrs. Quimby does not become
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ments are satisfied, then the elements of a private dispute Con-
sumer Protection Act claim are satisfied as well. This
congruence can lead to the result that a merely negligent act
invokes a series of penalties neither intended nor desired.
Because a "failure to disclose a material fact," the first ele-
ment of a lack-of-informed-consent claim, is per se deceptive,7'
it automatically constitutes the "unfair or deceptive act"
required by the first prong of Hangman. The "trade or com-
merce" requirement of the second prong of the Consumer Pro-
tection Act private action test is easily met by applying the
analysis in Short that a learned professional (here a health
care professional) is engaged in commerce.72
An examination of the factors of the Hangman public
interest requirement, in the context of a lack-of-informed-con-
sent claim, leads to the conclusion that the third prong of the
Hangman test will also be satisfied.7' First, the act supporting
a lack-of-informed-consent claim invariably occurs during the
course of the medical professional's business.74 Second, a
defendant health care provider likely performs at least mini-
mal advertising by placing a listing in the yellow pages.75
Third, a defendant health care provider "solicits" the patient
when he invites a patient to undergo a therapeutic or diagnos-
tic procedure. 76 Finally, there is an obvious inequality of bar-
gaining position in the physician-patient relationship.77
pregnant. Does she have a compensable injury? This question is beyond the scope of
the present inquiry.
71. Tallmadge v. Aurora Chrysler-Plymouth, 25 Wash. App. 90, 605 P.2d 1275
(1975); Testo v. Dunmire Olds, 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976).
72. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
74. This first factor is somewhat redundant in light of the "trade or commerce"
requirement of the second prong. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
75. See Comment, Private Suits, supra note 51, at 812 ("[I]t is difficult to see why
the standard of solicitation/public offering should be applied differently to merchants
than it is to professionals .... ").
The Comment suggests that merely hanging out a shingle and placing a listing in
the yellow pages ought to satisfy this prong.
76. To "solicit" is to awaken or excite to action, or to invite. In re Winthrop, 135
Wash. 135, 138, 237 P. 3, 4-5 (1925). See also Comment, Private Suits, supra note 51, at
811.
77. It has been observed that "the patient is rarely in a position to propose
treatment. He consults a physician because he lacks the knowledge to diagnose or the
ability to cure whatever malady has befallen him," and that "legal protection of the
patient's right to receive information is prompted by the unequal inforrnational status
of the parties." (emphasis added). Comment, Informed Consent in Washington:
Expanded Scope of Material Facts that the Physician Must Disclose to his Patient, 55
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Recall that it is not necessary for all of these factors to be
present to satisfy the public interest requirement78 and that
the Hangman court seemed inclined to find this prong more
easily satisfied than under earlier formulations of the test for
the presence of a public interest.79 It is apparent that in almost
every case each factor will be present to some extent, and that
the business, solicitation, and bargaining factors will be present
in every medical injury case. Given the magnitude of the dis-
parity in bargaining positions between a health care provider
and his patient, this bargaining position factor could possibly
suffice alone in all instances. Thus, there is sufficient public
interest in a generic lack-of-informed-consent cause of action
to satisfy this prong in essentially every case.
In a lack-of-informed-consent claim, the injury prong of
Hangman, is satisfied if plaintiff's "property" suffers "mere
financial injury."' This financial injury can consist simply of
the legal expenses of bringing the action.8 ' Financial injury
can also be proved by any additional medical or other expenses
arising from the alleged act. 2
Finally, while the Hangman test requires a causal link, 3
lack-of-informed-consent claims require proof of proximate
WASH. L. REV. 655, 657 (1980) [hereinafter Comment, Informed Consent in
Washington].
78. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text. Plaintiff would be well advised
to continue to analyze and perhaps to argue his case under the earlier Anhold
inducement-damage-repetition test. Presumably, because the Hangman court relaxed
this latter test, if plaintiff can satisfy it, he will also have satisfied the Hangman public
interest requirement. The Anhold formula for finding a public interest in a private
transaction, that is, proof of actual repetition, was pled in Quimby. Brief for
Respondent at 27-29, Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 724 P.2d 403. But see supra
note 22.
80. Tallmadge v. Aurora Chrysler-Plymouth, 25 Wash. App. 90, 93-94, 605 P.2d
1275, 1278 (1979). See also St. Paul Ins. v. Updegrave, 33 Wash. App. 653, 658-59, 656
P.2d 1130, 1133 (1983) (plaintiff need show no specific money damages and can recover
attorneys' fees without any award of pecuniary damages. Recoverable damages include
the consumer's inconvenience, loss of time in helping prepare the case, time spent in
court, attorneys' fees, filing fees, investigation expenses and expert witness fees).
81. Tallmadge, 25 Wash. App. at 93-94, 605 P.2d at 1278.
82. "A consumer whose money has been diminished by reason of an antitrust
violation has been injured 'in his . . . property' within the meaning of . . . the
Consumer Protection Act." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), quoted in
Keyes v. Bollinger, 31 Wash. App. 286, 296, 640 P.2d 1077, 1084 (1982). The Keyes court
also acknowledged that personal injury might cause financial injury to property.
"Should 'mental distress, embarrassment, and inconvenience', in fact entail pecuniary
loss, we discern no reason under the (Consumer Protection Act] to exclude such
damages." Id. at 296, 640 P.2d at 1084.
83. For numerous causal "links" in the lack of informed consent causal claim, see
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cause in order to succeed. 4 The proximate cause requirement
in the doctrine of informed consent functions to insure that
recovery cannot be obtained for injuries unconnected to the
physician's breach of his duty to disclose.8 5 Given proximate
cause of the injury by the failed disclosure in the underlying
lack-of-informed-consent claim, there is a sufficient "causal
link" to sustain the Consumer Protection Act action. 86
As a result of this simultaneous satisfaction of the ele-
ments of the lack-of-informed-consent statute and the prongs
of the Hangman private dispute test, one who prevails in an
action for lack of informed consent is just one short step from
recovery under the Consumer Protection Act.8 This latter
recovery may include attorneys' fees, costs, and treble damages
to a limit of $10,000.00.88 When ordinarily a plaintiff pays his
own fees and costs, the Consumer Protection Act shifts this
burden to a losing defendant. 9 While the court retains some
discretion in awarding these items,90 there is no possibility of a
Comment, Informed Consent in Washington, supra note 77, at 666 passim with five
"links" listed at 670.
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050(1)(d) (1987).
85. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
86. A successful suit under informed consent theory requires some causal
connection between the undisclosed material fact and the injury to the patient. Waltz
& Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628, 643-46 (1969). If
there is "connection," there is "link." Thus, the "link" is required for success in the
underlying lack of informed consent claim.
87. Short indicated that an area of conduct would not be excluded from the
Consumer Protection Act based solely upon the existence of other remedies at law.
103 Wash. 2d at 65, 691 P.2d at 170. For example, a plaintiff can recover under the
Consumer Protection Act and separately in tort. See Sherwood v. Bellevue Dodge,
Inc., 35 Wash. App. 741, 669 P.2d 1258 (1983). There is no explicit prohibition on
recovery under either the Consumer Protection Act or WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050
(1987) (Failure to Secure Informed Consent), or under the plain language of WASH.
REV. CODE § 7.70.010 (1987).
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1987).
89. Plaintiff's legal fees and costs are far from insubstantial in the typical lack-of-
informed-consent case in which considerable time is spent and expense generated by
the requirement for expert testimony and discovery. Recovery of these expenses
under the Consumer Protection Act, or more correctly, avoidance of having the simple
lack-of-informed-consent recovery reduced by these amounts, is by far the most
attractive feature of this theory for plaintiff.
90. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. JMG Restaurants, 37 Wash. App. 1, 19, 680 P.2d 409,
420 (1984) (judge, not jury, establishes the attorney's fees to be awarded); Ivan's Tire
Service Store, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 10 Wash. App. 110, 128, 517 P.2d
229, 240 (1973) (contingent fee established between the attorney and client is not
binding); Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wash. 2d 581, 593, 675 P.2d 193,
201-02 (1983) (analytical framework developed in Lindy Bros. Blds. v. American
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reciprocal award of fees to a prevailing defendant.9 1 That por-
tion of the Consumer Protection Act award characterized as"punitive" or "exemplary" by defendant's liability carrier will
not be covered under the typical malpractice policy.92 In addi-
tion, because the Consumer Protection Act claim is not a
"tort" action,9 3 plaintiff may be able to circumvent any limita-
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) is the appropriate
formula by which to calculate reasonable attorneys' fees).
Failure to allow discovery deposition costs and costs of expert appearances is not
an abuse of the court's discretion. Safeco, 37 Wash. App. at 19, 680 P.2d at 420.
Defendant may argue these costs are properly allocable only to the underlying lack of
informed consent claim. But see Keyes, 31 Wash. App. 286 at 296, 640 P.2d at 1084, in
which, having found the damages awarded under the underlying claim to be within the
scope of the Consumer Protection Act, the court "need not consider the circumstances
under which such segregation [of legal fees for the different claims] may be required."
91. Only plaintiff, not defendant, is entitled to attorneys' fees under a Consumer
Protection Act action. Sato v. Century 21 Ocean Shores Real Estate, 101 Wash. 2d 599,
603, 681 P.2d 242, 245 (1984).
92. The leading case holding that insurance against punitive damages is contrary
to public policy is Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
But see Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. App. 1981); Lazenby v.
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn 639, 644, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964).
If there is a financial interest involved, negligence begins to blur into willful torts.
Therefore, punitive damages will attach. See Bloom, Risk Management in Health
Maintenance Organizations, 6 WHIrIER L. REV. 683, 683-88 (1984) (predicting
uninsurability for punitive damages for willful torts committed with apparent financial
motive).
Recovery of punitive damages is contrary to public policy in Washington and will
not be allowed unless expressly authorized by statute. Kammerer v. Western Gear
Corp., 96 Wash. 2d 416, 421, 635 P.2d 708, 711 (1981).
Numerous courts continue to find that insurance coverage [for punitive damages]
is against public policy as long as punitive damages are regarded as 'Punishment and
deterrence. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHNER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.14
(1985).
The author of this Note has a professional liability insurance policy that includes
(in "plain English") the following language:
Liability. To be covered, claims must be based on events that arise out of
the profession named in the Coverage Summary.
Defending Lawsuits. We'll defend any suit brought against any protected
person for covered claims ....
Individual [protected person]. If you are an individual shown in the
Coverage Summary, you're protected against claims that result from:
Professional services that you provided or should have provided. Form
No. #43562 Ed. 1-85, Insuring Agreement 42B, Liability Coverage, St. Paul
Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 1985.
Since any Consumer Protection Act Recovery cannot arise out of "professional"
activities, they are probably not covered. They may also be uninsurable as a matter of
public policy.
93. However, the Consumer Protection Act has been said to sound in tort. See
Comment, A Re-Evaluation, supra note 49, at 676. See, e.g., Nuttall v. Dowell, 31
Wash. App. 98, 639 P.2d 1349 (1978); Wilkinson v. Smith, 31 Wash. App. 1, 639 P.2d 768
(1982).
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tions imposed on his recovery by "tort reform" legislation.94 A
full spectrum of "actual damages," including pain and suffer-
ing,95 and emotional distress,96 can be recovered under the
Consumer Protection Act.
All these potential damages are consequences to defend-
ants who, before Quimby, were liable only for general and spe-
cial damages under what was essentially a negligence theory.
The act of the health care provider has not changed, the injury
to the patient has not changed, but the potential recovery for
the plaintiff has changed dramatically. It would seem that the
successful lack-of-informed-consent plaintiff has received a
windfall.
But, before the plaintiff can take advantage of the benefits
of a recovery under the Consumer Protection Act, he must
clear one additional hurdle imposed by Quimby-relate the
lack of informed consent to the entrepreneurial aspects of the
medical practice.97 In effect, the court has added a sixth prong
to the Hangman test or, perhaps better conceptually, a fifth
94. See S.B. 4630, the Washington Tort Reform Act of 1986. The bill was passed
and codified in WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250 and § 4.56.260, among other sections, as ch.
305, 1986 WASH. LAWS. See id. § 301, Limitations on Non-Economic Damages.
Since § 4.56.250 limits, or "caps" damages for "personal injury or death," its
provisions may also apply to personal injury damages alleged under the Consumer
Protection Act, although technically any recovery under the Consumer Protection Act
is for injury to "business or property." This semantic distinction could still exempt the
Consumer Protection Act from the statutory recovery limitations. Analysis of this
proposition is beyond the scope of this article.
It is worth noting that § 4.56.250 has come under heavy criticism and has been
characterized as "the height of unconstitutionality." Wiggins, Harnitiaux and Whaley,
Washington's 1986 Tort Legislation and the State Constitution: Testing the Limits, 22
GONZ. L. REV. 193, 226 (1986-87).
In at least one current case, WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250 (1987) has been ruled
unconstitutional. Foster v. Fiberboard Corp., King County Cause No. 87-2-05629-5. See
Zeder, 4630 Cap Held Unconstitutional, TRIAL NEWS 23:2, October 1987, at 1.
While undoubtedly the supreme court will eventually decide the issue, if the
question of Consumer Protection Act inclusion within the Tort Reform cap is not
moot, it is intriguing.
95. Actual damages include mental distress, embarrassment, and inconvenience.
See Keyes, 31 Wash. App. at 295, 640 P.2d at 1084. See also Ellingson v. Spokane
Mortgage Co., 19 Wash. App. 48, 58, 573 P.2d 389, 394 (1978) construing "actual
damages" as compensatory for all injuries in fact, as opposed to exemplary, nominal, or
punitive damages. The phrase "actual damages" appears in the Consumer Protection
Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1985). Actual damage is synomymous with general
or compensatory damages, and in distinction to nominal, exemplary or punitive
damages. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 467 (5th ed. 1979).
96. Keyes, 31 Wash. App. at 297, 640 P.2d at 1083 (mental distress, embarrassment,
and inconvenience are compensable if they entail pecuniary loss).
97. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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element to a lack-of-informed-consent action. Thus, if plain-
tiff's claim passes the entrepreneurial aspects test he will avail
himself of Consumer Protection Act remedies. But where
these aspects come from, nobody knows.9"
VI. "ENTREPRENEURIAL ASPECTS"
The phrase "entrepreneurial aspects" as used in Short and
Quimby seems to have an intuitive meaning, but it does not
provide a bright-line standard for courts to use in analyzing
cases. This situation is unfortunate because it is apparent that
the court did not intend all lack-of-informed-consent defend-
ants to be saddled with Consumer Protection Act liability.99 In
fact, the court attempted to articulate a test that would distin-
guish certain defendants for additional monetary sanctions. At
best, the test fails to address the practical problems of separat-
ing the professional and entrepreneurial aspects of the process
of obtaining informed consent. Moreover, the test is founded
on a phrase that has no fixed meaning."'
It has been said that courts use the terms "entrepreneurial
aspects," "business aspects," and "commercial aspects" inter-
changeably when referring to liability of professionals under
consumer protection statutes.10 1 However, the phrase invaria-
bly appears in case law without definition.0 2 Black's Law Dic-
tionary omits the phrase, but defines an entrepreneur as "one
98. Paraphrasing the Seven-Up Man from a widely broadcast television
advertisement in which he said, in pertinent part: "Once upon a time there was a soft
drink said to be made with the juice of 'lymons.' Where these 'lymons' come from,
nobody knows."
99. The courts in Quimby and Short took great pains to specifically exclude claims
of professional negligence from the purview of the Consumer Protection Act. See
supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
100. The supreme court passed on a recent opportunity to elaborate on the
definition of "entrepreneurial aspects" in Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107, 744
P.2d 1032 (1987). However, by rejecting "bald assertions" that "professionals" were by
definition engaged in the "entrepreneurial aspects" of their practice, the court may
also have rejected the troubling rationale that professionals are engaged in"entrepreneurial aspects" whenever their continuing fee income depends upon the
activities in question. See Brief for Intervenors at 116, Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash.
2d 107, 744 P.2d 1032 (1987) (No. 52559-5). The case is distinguishable from the present
context for a number of reasons, perhaps the most important of which is that the
professionals were not directly employed by the injured parties.
101. Note, Tolling the Death Knell on the "Learned Profession" Immunity Under
the Consumer Protection Act: Short v. Demopolis, 21 WILLAMETrE L.J. 899, 904 n.35
(1985). Njo authority is offered for this proposition, but the Note does seem to state the
semantic problem succinctly. In Short, the court used all three phrases. See Short, 103
Wash. 2d at 61, 691 P.2d at 171 (Pearson, J., concurring).
102. Research disclosed no case law definition of "entrepreneurial aspects." The
[Vol. 11:347
19881 Lack of Informed Consent
who, on his own, initiates and assumes the financial risks of a
new enterprise and who undertakes its management.' 0 3
Thesaural synonyms are offered as "manager, contractor, pro-
ducer," or "businessman." ''"4 Webster defines an entrepreneur
as "one who organizes and directs a business undertaking,
assuming the risk for the sake of the profit."' 5 From this defi-
nition, the "entrepreneurial aspects" of a medical practice con-
sist of those activities that affect "profits,"'0 6 and in particular
those that are attributable to a profit motive.
It is this loose association with "profit" that is particularly
troublesome because the medical professional earns his profit,
and hence his living, by performing services to which the
patient has (or has not) given informed consent.107 Therefore,
if "entrepreneurial aspects" refer to the profit opportunities of
the medical practice, these aspects would seem almost inextri-
cably bound to informed consent, or lack thereof. Both Wash-
ington0 8 and federal courts,0 9 however, have resisted the
temptation to classify opportunities for profits within
phrase appears in numerous N.L.R.B. decisions, see infra note 117, but again without
definition, and without the authority of formal court adoption.
The only case law construction of the phrase "entrepreneurial aspects" of a
[business], if that can be said to be the equivalent of "entrepreneurial activities,"
comes from the Workmen's Compensation Commission of Maine in Callahan v.
Callahan, 444 A.2d 401, 403 n.7 (Me. 1982). There, the Commission concluded as a
matter of law that entrepreneurial activities constitute projit other than "wages,
earnings or salary, including specifically profit from the labor of others .
(emphasis added).
Were the Washington courts to adopt such a definition for the entrepreneurial
aspects of a medical practice, some curious results might accrue. For example, a sole
proprietor physician employing a receptionist would probably be making a profit from
the labor of others, while a doctor who operated his practice in a "shell" corporation
drawing a salary as an employee would not; the corporation would have the profit. On
the other hand, if the courts were to look at the profit motive, more reasonable and
consistent results might be achieved.
103. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 498 (5th ed. 1979).
104. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD THESAURUS, 142 (Warner Books Ed. 1982).
105. WEBSTER'S NEW 20TH CENTURY DICTIONARY (unabridged 2d ed. 1975)
(emphasis added).
106. Whether these profits are gross, net, after-tax, etc. is irrelevant.
107. The health care provider is under a statutory duty to obtain informed consent
from his patients. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (1987). The duty attaches at many
points in the doctor-patient relationship and has been observed to give rise to a
potential conflict of interest. See generally President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research: Making
Health Care Decisions: A Report on the Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed
Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship, U.S. G.P.O. (1982). See also
Comment, Informed Consent in Washington, supra note 77.
108. Entrepreneurial aspects of a subcontractor's business were implicitly
distinguished from the potential for loss or profit and the proprietary interest in the
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entrepreneurial "aspects" or "activities." But most of the deci-
sions employing the phrase are concerned with whether an
individual was an employee or an independent contractor,1 0
which bears faint resemblance to the present inquiry.
Other writers have struggled to define the test. One Note
discussing Short"1 recognized that the Consumer Protection
Act focuses on the act of deceiving the client, rather than the
attorney's breach of due care. Once deception is established,
liability attaches under the Consumer Protection Act." 2 To
counterbalance this result, the "reasonable practice" exemp-
tion under section 19.86.920 of the Revised Code of Washing-
ton113 is advanced. Ostensibly, this exemption would re-
business by listing them in the conjunctive. Service Emp. Health & Welfare v. AAA
Bldg. and Maintenance, Inc., 41 Wash. App. 328, 704 P.2d 644 (1985).
109. See Brown v. N.L.R.B., 462 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1972), implicitly
distinguishing "entrepreneurial aspects" from the risk of loss and opportunity for
profit, and a proprietary interest: "The Board has emphasized three factors, each
including various factual considerations: (1) the 'entrepreneurial aspects' of the
dealer's business, including 'right to control'; (2) the risk of loss and opportunity for
profit; and (3) the dealer's proprietary interest .... Accord, Sida of Hawaii, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 512 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1975); Merchant's Homes Delivery Serv. Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 580 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1978). States have blurred the distinction. Cf. State v.
Daquino, 56 N.J. Super. 230, 152 A.2d 377 (1959) ("entrepreneurial aspects" were
implicitly equated with proprietary aspects by considering the two in the disjunctive).
Brown is the case used by most courts that discuss the phrase, but that case does
not define the term. Among NLRB decisions per se there seems to be a cavalier
parroting of the phrase or its equivalent without considering its definition. For
example, "genuine" entrepreneurial activity impliedly allows one "economic latitude."
Standard Oil Company, 230 NLRB 967 (1977); P.Q. Beef Processors, 231 NLRB 1076
(1977). Entrepreneurial aspects of business are impliedly distinct from the ability to
make "numerous decisions affecting... economic fortunes." Prentiss & Carlisle Co.,
230 NLRB 373, 375 (1977). Proprietary interests are implicitly distinct from "other
factors, such as the "entrepreneurial aspects," risks of loss, and opportunities for profit
.The Virginian-Pilot Ledger Star, 241 NLRB 575 (1979).
But there is a persistent reference to profit. See Standard Oil Co., 231 NLRB at
968, 971 ("[d]istributors operate on a profit basis with considerable opportunity to
influence their earnings by their own entrepreneurial efforts;" "[d]ecisions of an
entrepreneurial nature ... affect profit or risk of loss .... ").
110. See supra notes 108-09.
111. Note, Washington Lawyers, supra note 27. While calling the entrepreneurial
aspects test a "solution," the author consistently characterized it as a commercial/non-
commercial test. Id. at 931 n.35. The Note goes on to give examples of problems
making that distinction in the practice of law. Id. at 939 & n.77. While the author
argued for wider application of the Consumer Protection Act to the legal profession,
he too was searching for a clearer delineation of precisely when the Consumer
Protection Act should apply.
112. Id. at 944.
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (1987) provides in pertinent part: "It is,
however, the intent of the legislature that this act shall not be construed to prohibit
acts or practices which are reasonable in relation to the development and preservation
of business or which are not injurious to the public interest."
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introduce an element of fault on the part of the professional.114
However, this protection breaks down in the context of medi-
cal lack of informed consent. Violation of a statutory duty to
obtain informed consent can scarcely be a "reasonable" prac-
tice that falls within this exception. It can be forecefully
argued that failure to obtain informed consent is per se
unreasonable.
And there is no solace in the Note's observation that
deceptive acts generally refer to advertising or other represen-
tations used to induce a sale.1 ' The only proper way to sell
health care services is to obtain informed consent for their pro-
vision. Further, there is no solace in the Note's conclusion that
Washington courts restrict application of the Consumer Pro-
tection Act to violations occurring only in the inducement
stage of a transaction." 6 During the consent conference, the
patient is induced to undergo the procedure through the
required disclosure of both the risks of failing to undergo a
procedure 17 and the benefits of the proposed procedure." 8 If
the conference is either negligently or deliberately" 9"stacked"'120 to insure a particular choice by the patient, then
the alleged violation of the Consumer Protection Act occurred
during the inducement. 2 '
Before abandoning the search for a useful definition of
entrepreneurial aspects, it may be helpful to attempt to glean a
114. Note, Washington Lawyers, supra note 27, at 944.
115. Id. at 945 n.108.
116. Id. at n.111 (citing Comment, A Re-Evaluation, supra note 49).
117. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980);
Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979).
118. See Comment, Informed Consent in Washington, supra note 77.
119. Your author hastens to add to the quandary by noting that a deliberate
manipulation of the consent conference can occur with either an innocent or malicious
motive. An example of an innocent manipulation might be the withholding of a risk
that the physician thought was immaterial, but that might frighten the patient into
refusing needed care.
120. This "stacking" of the conference is easily accomplished by emphasizing the
risks of refusing a procedure and the benefits of accepting it. The order of
presentation, tone of voice, and personal recommendation of the provider are all tools
to manipulate the unwary patient. (Health care providers can even attend tax-
deductible seminars to learn precisely these skills for precisely the purpose of "selling"
patients particular health care services.)
121. Note, Washington Lawyers, supra note 27, at n.110. The author also observed
that "a distinction limited solely to 'entrepreneurial aspects' does not encompass a
motivation test." Yet the distinction in Quimby is based on entrepreneurial aspects. If
not a motivation test, it is still the test with which one must distinguish cases. The
solution offered by the Note was a "bad faith" test. Negligence would not satisfy this
test.
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definition of the phrase from the context in which it was first
applied to the learned professions in Washington. Since the
Quimby court relied on Short, the contextual meaning of the
phrase in Short should be given deference. Presumably, even
if the Quimby court had no precise definition of
entrepreneurial aspects in mind, it intended those words to
have the same meaning as in the supreme court's earlier
decision.
The examples of entrepreneurial aspects enumerated in
Short are "how the price of legal services is determined, billed,
and collected and the way a law firm obtains, retains and dis-
misses clients.' 1 22 In dicta, the Quimby court indirectly sug-
gested how entrepreneurial aspects might trigger a cause of
action under the Consumer Protection Act:123
[A] lack-of-informed-consent claim can be based on dis-
honest and unfair practices used to promote the
entrepreneurial aspects of a doctor's practice, such as when
the doctor promotes an operation or service to increase prof-
its and the volume of patients, then fails to adequately
advise the patient of risks or alternative procedures. 124
Grafting the Quimby dicta onto the Short language sug-
gests that the entrepreneurial aspects of a doctor's practice will
relate to the failure to obtain informed consent if: 1) a doctor's
decision to perform a particular operation (or procedure) is
influenced by how the price of services is determined, billed,
and collected, and by how the medical practice obtains, retains
and dismisses patients; 2) a doctor promotes a service to
increase profits or volume and fails to advise the patient of
risks or alternative procedures; or 3) the consent a doctor
obtains is related to how the price of services is determined,
billed and collected, or to how a medical practice obtains,
retains and dismisses patients.
Any of these examples ostensibly satisfies the Quimby
court's interpretation of entrepreneurial aspects. The first two
examples generally identify reprehensible conduct-therapeu-
tic decisions made for economic reasons. 25 But it is not at all
122. 103 Wash. 2d at 61, 691 P.2d at 168.
123. 45 Wash. App. at 181, 724 P.2d at 406.
124. Id.
125. See Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Assn. of Colleges and
Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 655 n.21 (1970) (there may be situations in which
a traditional noncommercial activity would be conducted with a commercial motive,
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clear that the third example represents anything but ethical,
good faith medical practice.126 That the health care provider
obtains consent to perform procedures for which he charges
and bills fees'27 certainly seems to relate to how the medical
practice obtains and retains patients. Therefore, the difficulty
lies not so much in distinguishing those lack-of-informed-con-
sent claims that do relate to the entrepreneurial aspects of a
medical practice as in determining which claims do not. 2  This
seems to be a "test" plaintiff cannot fail.
The plaintiff who successfully establishes the elements of
his lack-of-informed-consent claim has not only satisfied the
applicable Hangman test, 129 but has also found that lack of
informed consent always relate to the entrepreneurial aspects
of the defendant's medical practice. In effect, plaintiff has
automatically qualified for relief under the Consumer Protec-
tion Act by stating a lack-of-informed-consent claim.
Since the courts set out to establish a test, however, there
must be a presumption that the test will differentiate between
cases and fact patterns, applying the Consumer Protection Act
here, but not there. Washington courts have not provided a
useful interpretation of this test, but the test exists and its
proper role and use can be explained.
thus rendering it commercial). The case concerned a refusal of an accrediting body to
extend certification to the college because the school was not a "non-profit"
institution. The court found that it was not unreasonable to conclude that the desire
for profit might influence educational goals in subtle ways. Thus, there was no
violation of the school's asserted fifth amendment right to accreditation when the
association withheld certification.
126. The doctrine of informed consent allows a patient to recover damages from a
health care provider despite having received non-negligent medical diagnosis and
treatment. Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 237, 523 P.2d 211, 216-17 (1974). Thus, a
lack-of-informed-consent claim based on a negligent (unintentional) failure to disclose
would afford plaintiff a recovery under the Consumer Protection Act if plaintiff could
pass the entrepreneurial aspects test. The reader should note carefully that the
Consumer Protection Act does not attach to injuries from intentionally substandard
treatment. That is, if a health care provider intentionally deviates from the standard
of care in the actual delivery of services, the plaintiff recovers only "negligence"
damages. Thus, the patient recovers less, and the provider is exposed to less personal
financial risk, if the procedure is intentionally botched than if the procedure is
perfectly performed but the consent is defective.
127. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
128. After the Short decision, commentators remarked upon the problems in using
the test to differentiate between types of activities of the practice of law. For an
exposition on the parallel difficulty of distinguishing reprehensible acts with the
entrepreneurial aspects test in the practice of law, see Note, Washington Lawyers,
supra note 27, at 938-39. See also supra notes 111-121 and accompanying text.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 49-88.
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In Little v. Rosenthal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court considered the interaction of a consumer protection act
with a statute that required "every action for malpractice,
error or mistake against a provider of healthcare" to be sub-
mitted to a screening tribunal.130 In Little, the court first
interpreted the language of the screening statute to indicate
that all treatment-related claims fell under the statute.' 3' The
court distinguished consumer protection actions that allege
unfair trade practices in medical treatment from those that
merely raise such questions as fraudulent or deceptive billing
practices by a health care provider. 32
The Little court argued that in a deceptive billing case, the
screening "procedure would be inappropriate since there
would be no issue of medical 'malpractice, error or mistake.'
No such problem, however, [was] presented by the instant
cases. Since the plaintiff herself admit[ted] that the same set
of facts supports both her malpractice claims and her [Con-
sumer Protection Act] claims . . . , the screening statute
controlled the procedural disposition of her case.' 34 Failure to
satisfy the requirements of that statute resulted in a dismissal
of all of plaintiff's claims.
Thus, the Massachusetts "all claims" medical injury stat-
ute construed in Little, which is analogous to Washington's "all
claims for injuries from healthcare" statute, 35 was outcome
determinative of the Consumer Protection Act claims. Like
the Washington courts in Quimby and Short, the Massachu-
130. Little v. Rosenthal, 376 Mass. 573, 576, 382 N.E.2d 1037, 1040 (1978). The
patient sued a nursing home alleging medical malpractice, breach of contract, and
violation of the Consumer Protection Act because of unfair trade practices. She
submitted her claims to the medical screening tribunal, but objected to its
consideration of her consumer claims. The tribunal found no legitimate judicial
question and ordered posting of a bond for continuance of the actions in court. When
the patient failed to post the bond, the actions were dismissed. The issue on appeal
was whether the tribunal erred in considering the consumer claims. Held: No error
because the actions alleged unfair trade practices in medical treatment. The court
reached this conclusion because the same set of facts supported both the consumer
claims and the malpractice claims. Consumer claims that raised such questions as
fraudulent or deceptive billing practices by a health care provider would have been
allowed to circumvent the screening tribunal.
131. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.010 (1987). See supra note 66 and accompanying
text.
132. 376 Mass. at 577, 382 N.E.2d at 1041. Cf. Short, 103 Wash. 2d at 70-71, 691 P.2d
at 172 (Pearson, J., concurring in part).
133. 376 Mass. at 577, 382 N.E.2d at 1041 (latter emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.010 (1987).
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setts court carefully segregated the Consumer Protection Act
and "malpractice" claims. The Little court did not indicate
whether a separate Consumer Protection Act cause of action
could have gone forth simultaneously with the accompanying
negligence claim- had the procedural posture been correct.
Nevertheless, the case parallels Quimby in the sense that an"all claims" statute interfaced with a Consumer Protection Act
cause of action. Further, as in Quimby, something more than
mere satisfaction of the "all claims" statute was required to
support the Consumer Protection Act claim. 136
A test modeled after Little would read like this: If the
identical set of facts supports both the plaintiff's lack-of-
informed-consent and Consumer Protection Act claims, the
informed consent statute is exclusively controlling. For the
policy reasons outlined below,137 this result affords the plain-
tiff an adequate remedy at law. This situation is to be distin-
guished from a common nucleus of facts supporting both a
lack-of-informed-consent claim and a Consumer Protection Act
claim to which additional facts can be added to further the
Consumer Protection Act claim.
A requirement of additional facts acknowledges that
securing informed consent is inextricably bound with the eco-
nomic, if not the entrepreneurial, aspects of every medical
practice, and presumes that the legislature contemplated this
in fashioning Washington's statutes controlling claims based on
injuries resulting from health care. For additional, separate
Consumer Protection Act recovery, additional, separate facts
relating the entrepreneurial aspects of the medical practice to
the lack-of-informed-consent claim would be necessary. It is
not the mere lack of informed consent that justifies application
of the Consumer Protection Act, but something within the pro-
cess leading to the failed consent that can be characterized as adeceptive or surreptitious act, motivated by profit, that vali-
dates the harsh sanctions of the Consumer Protection Act. 38
136. In Quimby, of course, the statute in question is WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050
(1987), the informed consent statute. The "something more" is that the claim must"relate to the entrepreneurial aspects of the medical practice." See supra notes 4-6 and
accompanying text.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 147-64.
138. Unlike when alternative theories might allow recovery if one theory fails andthe other succeeds, though both are supported by the same fact pattern, in thissituation plaintiff can recover under both theories, and the damages are essentially
cumulative. Requiring additional facts to support an enlarged claim does not seem anunreasonable burden for plaintiff. Recall that before there can be any recovery for
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A requirement of additional facts is not a simple reitera-
tion of Quimby. Rather, it requires that the relationship
between the lack of informed consent and the "entrepreneurial
aspects" of a medical practice be hyperrelated-that is, but for
the health care provider's profit motive, lack of informed con-
sent would not have occurred. It is insufficient to sustain both
a lack-of-informed-consent and Consumer Protection Act claim
to assert that defendant made a profit and he did not secure
informed consent. Instead, the requirement must be that
defendant made a profit because he did not secure informed
consent.139 Thus, the court should look to an economic or
profit motive14 ° as the real arbiter of its "entrepreneurial
aspects" test.1 4 1
This recommendation is compatible with the suggestion
made earlier'42 that "entrepreneurial aspects" of a medical
practice, or any business for that matter, involve profit motiva-
tion. 1 43  Additionally, it focuses more on how the
injury resulting from health care under the Consumer Protection Act, plaintiff must
prove a claim of lack of informed consent. Therefore, plaintiff has already proved a
claim for damages and seeks to increase that claim by appending the Consumer
Protection Act cause of action.
139. Compare this with the suggestion that "bad faith" ought to be found on the
part of an attorney before applying the Consumer Protection Act. See Note,
Washington Lawyers, supra note 27, at 945.
140. This Note suggests that the profit motive should be implied by any effort to
obtain additional income, reduce costs, or decrease the practitioner's effort. This
suggestion encompasses the motive of the "non-profit" provider who fails to obtain
informed consent because he did not wish to perform a particular procedure. It
encompasses inducement of a defective consent to a more expensive procedure,
generating increased cash flow, as well as consent to a less expensive, but less costly
procedure that generates increased net cash flow. It also encompasses what is far more
likely to be the most typical abuse of informed consent: the practitioner induces a
defective consent to undergo the only type of procedure he has the ability, equipment,
or license to perform. This suggestion obviates knee-jerk determinations based only on
the expense to the patient; substitution of even a less expensive procedure can still be
a profit-making event for the physician.
141. The Quimby court may have been alluding to this profit motive in dicta
referring to "entrepreneurial motives" and stating that "a lack of informed consent
claim can be based in dishonest and unfair practices used to promote the
entrepreneurial aspects .... " 45 Wash. App. at 182, 724 P.2d at 406 (emphasis added).
It remains painfully necessary to define "entrepreneurial aspects" before it is possible
to determine if unfair or dishonest practices were used to promote them.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
143. A profit motivation can be supplied by an opportunity to increase cashflow,
increase net cashflow, increase patient base, decrease or contain expenses, or reduce
physical effort. Little emphasis should be applied to the "bottom line" that one
usually associates with profit. The jingle, "maximum income for minimum output"
perhaps best illustrates the range of ways in which a profit motivation can be shown.
One somewhat more insidious way in which a failed consent can relate to the
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"entrepreneurial aspects" of a medical practice relate to the
lack-of-informed-consent claim and less on how to determine
simply what those aspects are. It must be accepted that a lack-
of-informed-consent claim may relate to a practitioner's profit,and perhaps even his motivation. But by requiring that lack of
informed consent be hyperrelated to the practitioner's profit
motive, culpable, "dishonest and unfair" '144 conduct is separated
from otherwise professional, albeit negligent, activity. The
Consumer Protection Act is thus invoked only when its reme-
dial or protective functions are necessary. 145
In effect, an entrepreneurial aspects test focusing on profit
motive reinserts into private Consumer Protection Act claims
the need to show intentional deception. This requirement isnecessary to counterbalance Hangman's facile deceptive act
prong and to protect the medical professional from Consumer
entrepreneurial aspects of a medical practice occurs when the health care providerdoes not take sufficient time to cover all the information to be disclosed because thetime could be spent more remuneratively on other, professional activities. This failureto take the time to accomplish informed consent has been noted as an illegitimate
objection to the need to obtain informed consent in both the legal and medicalcontexts. See Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: the
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C.L. REV. 315, 334-35 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss,
Argument for Autonomy].
144. 45 Wash. App. at 181, 724 P.2d at 406.
145. Intent is not a required element for a Consumer Protection Act claim inWashington. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. However, in otherjurisdictions courts will not award exemplary or punitive damages without a finding of
an intentional act.
In New York, treble damages are allowed only when the plaintiff can prove thatthe violation was intentional. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350-d(3) (McKinney Supp. 1986);Beslity v. Manhattan Honda, 120 Misc.2d 848, 467 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1983) (inadvertent
error by a third party will not result in an award of treble damages for false
advertising).
Texas distinguishes between innocent and intentional deceit and allows trebledamages only when there is proof that the deceit was intentional. TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(i) (Vernon 1986); see also Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d682, 690-91 (Tex. 1980) (imposition of treble damages on seller who knowingly mademisrepresentations); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Valencia, 690 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.1985) (two of the legislative goals behind the 1979 amendments to the Deceptive TradePractices Act were to eliminate mandatory treble damages against sellers who makeinnocent misrepresentations and to give the trier of fact discretion to award treble
damages for knowing violations).
The proposed test reintroduces the requirement of intent under the euphemism ofan "entrepreneurial aspects" test. Since the announced intention of the Consumer
Protection Act is to deter deceptive conduct before it occurs (see supra textaccompanying notes 50-52), it is difficult to see how this objective can be accomplishedby imposing punitive damages on unintentional acts. Deterring negligence may also bean objective of the Consumer Protection Act, but it has not been announced as such,
and is of questionable practical merit.
374 University of Puget Sound Law Review
Protection Act liability for conduct that is merely negligent.'46
The commercial defendant needs less protection against the
deceptive act prong because many commercial claims are
smaller than those in a private dispute against a medical pro-
fessional. Perhaps the court would have been better advised to
have required a higher level of proof to show a deceptive act in
a private dispute claim. It may be that the Quimby court did
the best it could to accommodate these considerations within
the holding of Hangman as binding authority.
VII. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR "HYPERRELATED"
ENTREPRENEURIAL ASPECTS
As stated in Short, the remedy of the Consumer Protection
Act is needed in actions against learned professionals to fill"gaps left vacant by existing . . . law . .. "147 because of the
expense of attorneys' fees and costs that can be recovered
under the Consumer Protection Act and the shortcomings of
remedies available to victims of professional malpractice. 48
The court rightly apprehended that the magnitude of those
costs, in relation to the amount of damages potentially recover-
able, may effectively foreclose a plaintiff's ability to pursue a
remedy at law. 149 The Consumer Protection Act erases the dis-
incentive to bring claims that those costs represented. It even
encourages some "private attorney general"' ° activity with its
146. "The standard of proof in awarding punitive damages should be higher than
in awarding compensatory damages." ABA Commission Releases Report on Ways to
Improve the Tort Liability System, The Brief, Winter 1987 at 5.
147. 103 Wash. 2d 52, 62, 691 P.2d 163, 169, citing Comment, The Learned
Professional, supra note 34, at 437. The widest "gap" results from the futility of
bringing a lawsuit to recover relatively insignificant actual damages. There is no
remedy if the costs of bringing suit approach or exceed the potential recovery. Thus,
unfair or deceptive acts of minor financial consequence to any individual plaintiff,
while reprehensible, are irremediable without the Consumer Protection Act. See
Comment, The Learned Professional, supra note 34, at 436 ("The classic malpractice
action is typically expensive, requiring costly preparation and expert testimony.
Because of the requisite extensive litigation, this form of action is seldom worthwhile
where potential damages do not reach into the several thousands of dollars.").
148. Short, 103 Wash. 2d at 62, 691 P.2d at 168-69.
149. Id. For arguments that plaintiffs will not seek remedies, see Note, Medicare's
Prospective Payment System: Can Quality Care Survive?, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1417, 1434
(1984) ("[C]ompensation may be unavailable ... if contingent fees and medical bills are
likely to exceed any award.").
"Because attorneys have an average fee rate of about one-third of the amount
received, many refuse cases when it appears that the settlement or award will not
exceed $10,000. Annas, Katz & Trakinas, Medical Malpractice Litigation Under
National Health Insurance: Essential or Expendable?, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1344.
150. See St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Updegrave, 33 Wash. App. 653, 658-59, 656 P.2d 1130,
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promise of an award of punitive or exemplary damages. The
Consumer Protection Act, for example, affords treble damages
up to a limit of $10,000.00 in addition to fees and costs. 15 1
But, in the typical medical injury case, the proportion of
potentially recoverable damages to fees and costs associated
with bringing a lawsuit are reversed; the magnitude of the
damages overshadows the attendant costs and legal fees. Since
most of these actions are brought on a contingent fee basis,15 2
plaintiffs are not foreclosed from pressing their claims by the
specter of losing money on a winning claim.5 3 Although the
plaintiff ultimately bears the cost of litigation, payment of
one's own civil legal expenses is rooted in the system of Ameri-
can jurisprudence. 54 Thus, much of the justification for appli-
cation of the Consumer Protection Act is simply not present in
a medical injury claim.
In the Tort Reform Act of 1986, the legislature clearly
attempted to limit the size of personal injury awards.'5 5 At the
same time, there appears to be no cap on pain and suffering
damages under the Consumer Protection Act, and actual dam-
ages are recoverable. 56 Further, it is worth noting that had
the legislature ever intended'5 7 the Consumer Protection Act
1133 (1983) (treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees recovered under the ConsumerProtection Act serve not only to enable plaintiff to pursue his claim, but also to
reimburse private "attorney general" activity).
151. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1987).
152. U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Medical Malpractice-Report of the
Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice 32 (1973) ("[V]irtually all plaintiff
attorneys use a contingent fee arrangement in medical malpractice cases"). A lack-of-
informed-consent claim is different from a "malpractice" claim, but the client isunlikely to perceive the difference, and the same reasons for the predominance of the
contingent fee arrangement attach.
153. See Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 90 Wash. 2d 355, 360, 581 P.2d1349, 1351 (1978) ("[T]he necessity to employ and pay her attorneys has deprived
plaintiff of an adequate recovery. Her victory is a pyrrhic one, if a victory at all.").
154. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.010(5) (1987) excludes attorneys' fees from
recoverable costs except for statutory attorneys' fees exempted under § (6), and
reasonable attorneys' fees defending frivolous claims under § 4.84.185.
155. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250-.260 (1987). For a symposium of articles on the
provisions and implication of the act, see 22 GONZ. L. REV. (1987).
156. Ellingson v. Spokane Mortgage Co., 19 Wash. App. 48, 573 P.2d 389 (1978); St.Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Company v. Updegrave, 33 Wash. App. 653, 656 P.2d 1130
(1983).
157. The court in State v. Schwab, 103 Wash. 2d 542, 693 P.2d 108 (1985) lookedbeyond the "explicit link" veneer to deduce any legislative intent to apply theConsumer Protection Act to landlord-tenant law. Finding in the legislative history arejection of an amendment that would have provided an explicit link, the court
concluded that it was the legislature's intent not to link the statutes. Note, New
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to be automatically actionable in lack-of-informed-consent
cases, it could have declared a "public interest" in all informed
consent cases by writing a preamble to the informed consent
statute, as it has done with other statutes, providing a "specific
link" to the Consumer Protection Act.
158
While the legislature has differentiated actions founded on
medical negligence from lack of informed consent, 15 9 lack of
informed consent sounds in negligence.160 Further, while
Limits to the Application of the Consumer Protection Act, 61 WASH. L. REV. 275, 279-80
(1986) [hereinafter Note, New Limits].
The court also noted the hazard of relying on legislative history. The difficulty
has been remarked upon elsewhere. See generally Comment, Legislative History in
Washington, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 571 (1983). The informed consent statute is a
case in point of difficult research because it was passed in a second extraordinary
session in 1975, and usual references have been found to be unhelpful. However, the
legislative history in question is moot since, unlike the landlord-tenant act, the
informed consent statute post-dates the Consumer Protection Act and thus could have
included an explicit link. It does not, and the courts, post-Schwab, presume that
omission to be intentional. Hangman also stiffened the requirement for finding a per
se public interest, weakening this tack. On the other hand, there is less reason for
recourse to per se application of the Consumer Protection Act or its elements when its
direct application is now apparently available.
158. Hangman, 105 Wash. 2d at 786, 719 P.2d at 536. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
§ 18.35.180 (1987) (Hearing Aids Dispensing); § 19.09.340 (1987) (Charitable
Solicitations); § 19.100.190 (1987) (Franchise Investments); § 19.102.020 (1987) (Chain
Distributor Schemes); § 19.105.500 (1987) (Camping Clubs). See also statutes amended
to invoke Consumer Protection Act application: WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.440 (1987)
(Collection Agencies); § 49.60.030(3) (1987) (Laws Against Discrimination); § 19.52.036
(1987) (Interest-Usury). This list is not exhaustive.
Arguments to overcome any "sub-silentio" preclusion of the Consumer Protection
Act by failure to write a preamble to the informed consent statute, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.70.050 (1987) or its "purpose" section, § 7.70.010 (1987), as advanced in Note, New
Limits, supra note 157, are mooted here since the Consumer Protection Act antedates
the informed consent statute. The legislature is presumed to have been aware of its
ability to apply the Consumer Protection Act to the statute, had that been its intent.
Note the dates these statutes were passed. The Legislature passed WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.70.050 (the informed consent statute) in 1975-76.
Schwab put the legislature on notice that per se application of the Consumer
Protection Act depends on an explicit link, inviting legislative response much as
Hangman did with the public interest requirement. A comparison of the Schwab
requirements with the elements for lack of informed consent leads one to conclude
that, but for lack of an explicit link, a successful informed consent claim would trigger
a per se violation of the Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiffs would have been spared
the vagaries of proving the public interest element of the factors. See supra notes 55-62
and accompanying text.
159. See WASH. REV. CODE § § 4.24.290, 7.70.030 (1987).
160. Watkins v. Parpala, 2 Wash. App. 484, 490-91, 469 P.2d 974, 978 (1970).
Watkins was the seminal case recognizing a lack-of-informed-consent cause of action in
Washington. See also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 189-93 (1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]
(informed consent is a subcategory of negligence). Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy
tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 146 (1977) ("[T]he law of informed consent
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much, if not all, of the requirement for intent has beenstripped away from Consumer Protection Act causes of
action,161 that law's antecedents trace back to common law
fraud,'62 which had an element of knowledge or intent. 163 This
higher level of culpability explains the essentially punitive
aspects of damages recoverable under the Consumer Protec-
tion Act. Damages under the informed consent statute should
suffice to "make the plaintiff whole." Additional awards can
serve only to punish, or to deter, conduct before injury. 64
But failure to obtain informed consent occurs in three
varieties: intentional, negligent, and non-negligent. 165  The
denotes a cause of action based on negligent failure to warn, i.e., failure to disclose
pertinent medical information").
161. "A plaintiff need not show that the act in question was intended to deceive
.... Hangman, 105 Wash. 2d at 785, 719 P.2d at 535.
162. Fraud is "[an intentional... false representation of a matter of fact.., or...
concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives, and is intended
to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 788 (5th ed. 1979). At least one jurisdiction deals with the entire concept
of lack of informed consent under a fraud analysis. See Leagan v. Levine, 158 Ga.App.
293, 293, 279 S.E.2d 741, 742 (1981), cited in Verre v. Allen, 175 Ga. App. 749, 750, 334
S.E.2d 350, 350 (1985) ("In cases involving a relation of trust and confidence, such as aphysician and patient, silence on the part of the physician when he should speak, orhis failure to disclose what he ought to disclose, is as much a fraud in law as an actual
affirmative false representation."). The informed consent doctrine has been judicially
declared to be non-existent in Georgia. Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga. App. 737, 222 S.E.2d 113
(1975).
163. See Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wash. 2d 40, 49, 614 P.2d 184, 190 (in passing the
Consumer Protection Act the legislature's intent was to protect the public against
consumer fraud).
164. Ironically, this is the reason the court gives for abolishing intent to deceive.
Hangman, 105 Wash. 2d at 785, 719 P.2d at 535.
165. Non-negligent lack of informed consent is rare. It occurs when the healthcare provider has not breached his duty to disclose. That is, he has conformed to the
standard of care for his profession, but the consent is defective for some other reason.
One such reason is that a jury will find that some undisclosed fact or risk or someundisclosed alternative "material." Another reason is that a new standard of
disclosure is suddenly, and retroactively, judicially imposed. Washington is often onthe cutting edge of extending the provider's duty to disclose. See Gates v. Jensen, 92
Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979) (failure to obtain consent not to perform additional
diagnostic tests after borderline test result indicating possible glaucoma). See also
Archer v. Galbraith, 18 Wash. App. 369, 379, 567 P.2d 1155, 1161 (1977) (failure todisclose the alternative of no treatment). Archer has been called one of "only a few
cases" that "squarely hold a doctor liable for failure to disclose alternatives." Shultz,
From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219,
241 n.85 (1985). The surgeon in Archer operated and earned a fee, which he would nothave earned had the alternative of no treatment been disclosed. A lack-of-informed-
consent claim can stand despite delivery of non-negligent, uninjurious care. Holt v.Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 237, 523 P.2d 211, 216-17 (1979). When there has been non-
negligent disclosure and non-negligent care should there be punitive Consumer
Protection Act sanctions?
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Washington statute166 is phrased in such a way as to impose a
duty of disclosure, to define how that duty may be breached,
and, to provide a remedy if there is injury and proximate
cause.117 This phrasing comprises a classical statutory negli-
gence formula. The informed consent statute16 does not dis-
tinguish between negligent or even non-negligent 16 9 failure to
secure informed consent and the very real possibility that in
some instances, such failure is intentional.Y It is only this
intentional misconduct that would seem the proper province
for additional remedies and punitive damages under the Con-
sumer Protection Act. The harsh result for the merely negli-
gent medical professional is that these damages are
uninsurable.
There is no case law on the insurability of punitive dam-
ages in this state because Washington is one of four jurisdic-
tions that reject punitive damages.171 Statutory damages under
166. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (1987).
167. See supra note 68 in which the full text of the statute is reproduced.
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (1987).
169. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (1987) from the Consumer Protection Act
provides in part: "this act shall not be construed to prohibit acts or practices which are
reasonable in relation to the development and preservation of business .... ." Of
course, negligent failure to obtain consent can never be "reasonable" unless the lack-
of-informed-consent claim itself fails, in which case the Consumer Protection Act
cannot apply because of the structure of the Quimby holding and because there was no
negligence.
Another purpose behind the Consumer Protection Act seems to go right to the
heart of the difficulty of its application to the informed consent statute. "If regulation
... is required, it should be limited to the absolute minimum essential to maintaining
a fair bargaining position for the consumer, with the least possible interference with
freedom of commercial enterprise because business and industry in this state and in
the nation are fundamentally legitimate and honest." O'Connell, Washington
Consumer Protection Act-Enforcement Provisions and Policies, 36 WASH. L. REV.
279, 284-85 (1961) (emphasis added). Legitimate and honest health care providers, to
whom Consumer Protection Act sanctions should not apply, can still be negligent in
failing to obtain informed consent as well as in directly providing services. Why should
there be punitive sanctions for negligent lack of informed consent and not for
negligent care?
170. See supra note 126. See also Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456 (7th Cir. 1982)
(when plaintiff alleged total lack of consent, the action was removed from negligence
and treated as an action for battery, an intentional tort. That is, total lack of consent is
not the equivalent of a lack of informed consent.).
171. Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 96 Wash. 2d 416, 635 P.2d 708 (1981)
(Stafford, J., dissenting). This case involved a question of comity with California law
that provided for punitive damages. The majority opinion found that California law,
and therefore California damages, governed the case. Id. at 423, 635 P.2d at 712. The
dissent asked the following question: "What kind of civil remedy for the plaintiff is
the punishment of the defendant?" Id. at 435, 635 P.2d at 719. This question ignores
the reality that general and special damages do not "make plaintiff whole." If money
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the Consumer Protection Act include punitive damages,'72
which are intended to serve a deterrent function.'7 3 Most lia-
bility policies do not expressly exclude punitive damages as a
kind of damage for which the policy will not respond.'74 But a
person has no right to expect the law to allow him to place
responsbility for his reckless and wanton acts on someone
else.'75 This shifting of responsibility would thwart the deter-
rent purposes of punitive damages.'76 By shifting responsibil-
ity to insurers, defendants would defy the sanction of punitive
damages. 7 7 If it is the policy of punitive damages to deter sim-
ilar misdeeds, 78 then the words of the court in American
Surety Co. of New York v. Gold' 9 strongly suggest that Wash-
ington courts would find the damages uninsurable:
The question is not so much the efficiency of the policy
underlying punitive damages; rather it is a question of the
implementation of that policy. Permitting the penalty for
the misdeed to be levied on one other than he who commit-
ted it cannot possibly implement the policy.' 8 1
But, enforcing this punitive damage policy reopens causes
of action that have been foreclosed by section 7.70.030 of the
Revised Code of Washington, which lists the only three per-
missible causes of action stemming from health care injuries."8 '
can be said to do the job at all, plaintiff is made whole minus attorneys' fees and costs.
Thus, these elements of punitive damages under the Consumer Protection Act are, in
fact, part of plaintiff's civil remedy. The question is less clear for the treble damages
provision.
172. Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 355, 360, 581 P.2d 1349, 1351
(1978) (Consumer Protection Act damages referred to as "exemplary"); Levy v. North
American Ins., 90 Wash. 2d 846, 586 P.2d 845 (1978) (remedy under WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.86.090 (1987) includes specified "punitive" damages).
173. Ghardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM 411, 411 (1972).
174. Id. at 420 (citing Punitive Damage Dilemma: A Possible Response, THE
NATIONAL UNDERWRITER 51 (May 5, 1972)).
175. Nicholson v. American Fire and Cas. Inc. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. App.
1965).
176. Id.
177. Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. App. 1964).
178. See supra text accompanying note 52.
179. 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966).
180. Id. at 527.
181. For the full text of this statute, see supra note 67. An ineffective consent
may be viewed as the equivalent of no consent at all. Therefore, the physician's
treatment constitutes an unpermitted touching, or battery. See Berkey v. Anderson, 1
Cal. App. 3d 790, 803, 82 Cal.Rptr. 67, 76-77 (1969). Battery is an intentional tort, yet in
the province of injury from health care, it is actionable in Washington only if
characterized as lack of informed consent. But see Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456 (7th
1988]
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As stated in the pleadings in Quimby, Dr. Fine used a surgical
procedure other than that for which he had secured consent,
an act traditionally actionable at common law as the inten-
tional tort of battery.182 Section 7.70.030 of the Revised Code of
Washington subsumes such actions within the three proposi-
tions left available to plaintiff as a matter of legislative
intent. 83 In Washington, not only is there no longer any medi-
cal battery, there is also no cause of action without injury.1'8
An injury resulting from the provision of health care serv-
ices will, at least to some extent, be physical. On the other
hand, an injury actionable under the Consumer Protection Act
resulting from the entrepreneurial aspects of the provision of
legal services is necessarily pecuniary. This difference is but
one of many differences between the learned professions of
law and medicine that both Quimby and Short failed to
recognize.
While there may be no reason to distinguish between the
professions of law and medicine on whether they are subject to
the Consumer Protection Act, differences do exist between the
two that highlight the difficulty of distinguishing
entrepreneurial aspects of the respective profession's normal
activities.8 5  For instance, while an attorney will be compen-
Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's action for total lack of consent removed from negligence and
treated as battery).
182. The leading case is Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
Plaintiff had consented to an operation on her right ear, but at the time of the surgery,
the physician determined the right ear to be in no need of surgery and opted to correct
a condition of the left ear by a procedure to which the patient had not consented.
Despite no showing of injury, or indeed despite a positive showing of benefit from the
procedure, defendant was held liable for battery.
Battery, an intentional tort, invites assessment of punitive damages, but
Washington is one of four jurisdictions that do not allow punitive damages. See supra
note 181.
183. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.030 (1987). For full text of this statute, see supra
note 67.
184. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.010.-030 (1987), supra notes 66-67.
185. Compare the contingent fee of an attorney to a commission. See The Standard
Oil Co., 241 NLRB Ann. Rep. 1248 (1979) (drivers compensated solely on a commission
basis have no opportunity to engage in the entrepreneurial activities normally
associated with independent contractors).
Compare also the patient's "right to control" his physician's activities through the
medium of informed consent. See The Comedy Store, 265 NLRB Ann. Rep. (1982)
(where the entrepreneurial aspects of an independent contractor's business can be so
clear that the 'right to control' test becomes unimportant).
Thus, NLRB usage of the phrase can be stretched to distinguish the professions.
Admittedly, the cases are inapposite, but it is from just such cases that the magic
words "entrepreneurial aspects" found their way into Quimby.
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sated on either an hourly or a contingent fee basis, the physi-
cian traditionally bills out a separate fee for each service; that
is, there are many separate instances in a medical practice
identifiable as distinct profitmaking events.1 8 6 While the physi-
cian is under a statutory requirement to obtain informed con-
sent (or risk liability), this duty will attach at many different
decision points.18 7 No comparable statutory requirement exists
for attorneys.
Undeniably, informed consent has a role in the practice of
law. Indeed, commentators have argued that informed consent
should assume a much larger role than that to which it has
been consigned.1 8 ' However, the very fact that such arguments
must be made is convincing evidence for the contention that
informed consent does not occupy a position in law comparable
to its present role in health care. Indeed, advocates of legal
informed consent recognize this position openly. 8 9
Attorneys are required to obtain written consent (presum-
186. Each of these represents, to some extent, a conflict of interest for the
physician, as has been remarked by some medical commentators. "The principal
conflict of interest within the doctor-patient relationship derives from the fact that
doctors' incomes rise when patients consume health care services that those same
doctors recommend and provide." Relman, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 749 (1985). Other motives are, of course, just as likely to give rise to a
conflict of interest. See, e.g., Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill.
1978) (In a DES case, what the doctors did not disclose were their research purposes.
Thus, what gave rise to a battery action was not the nature of the intervention, but the
motivation for intervening.).
187. For the proposition that the health care provider may be liable for failure to
obtain consent not to perform a diagnostic test, see Gates v. Jensen, 99 Wash. 2d 246,
595 P.2d 919 (1979). Washington's expanded scope of required disclosure... may allow
recovery for failing to disclose facts that are tenuously connected with the reasonable
patient's choice to forego treatment and thus avoid injury." Note, Informed Consent
in Washington, supra note 77, at 661-62.
"First, the physician has a duty to disclose material risks inherent in a
proposed treatment. Second, the physician has a duty to disclose alternative
courses of treatment, including no action, and their attendant risks. Third,
the physician has a duty to disclose the existence of a potentially dangerous
physical abnormality and the diagnostic steps, including tests, available to
ascertain the significance for that abnormality."
Id. at 657.
188. The first and most notable of these works is Spiegel, Lawyering and Client
Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41
(1979) [hereinafter Spiegel]. See also Strauss, Argument for Autonomy, supra note
143; Ellman, Symposium: Clinical Education: Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV.
717, 720 n.8 (1987).
189. Strauss, Argument for Autonomy, supra note 143, at 317 (the informed
consent model has not been applied to the legal profession).
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ably informed consent) only in certain situations.190 Consent is
required for entering a business relationship or acquiring a
pecuniary interest adverse to a client's interests. Consent is
required to disclose confidential information to the disadvan-
tage of the client.1 9" '
Under the traditional allocation of decisionmaking author-
ity in the legal setting, the client decides the ends of a lawsuit
while the attorney controls the means.' 92 In health care, the
ends are usually understood to be regaining or optimizing the
patient's health. But by giving or withholding his consent, the
patient has a great deal of control over the means to reach
those ends.
Perhaps one of the fundamental differences between the
legal and medical professions, at least with regard to informed
consent, is simply this: A patient must consent, at least in
some sense, in order for the doctor to perform treatment; in
contrast, much of what an attorney does for a client is per-
formed outside the client's presence.'9 3
The practical difficulties of distinguishing professional
from entrepreneurial aspects of a medical practice within the
realm of informed consent place both courts and health care
professionals in uncomfortable positions. Having stated that
intent is not a requirement for a Consumer Protection Act
claim,'94 the courts must now look for intent under the euphe-
mism of "relating to entrepreneurial aspects."' 95 Health care
providers, faced with the prospect of coverage exclusions in
their liability policies for punitive damages,' 96 could face sub-
stantial personal liability for negligent failure to disclose risks.
190. See WASHINGTON RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rules 1.7(b)(2), 1.8(b),
1.8(h), 1.9(a) and 2.2(a) (1988).
191. R. Aronson, An Overview of the Law of Professional Responsibility: The
Rules of Professional Conduct Annotated and Analyzed, 61 WASH. L. REV. 823, 843
(1986) ("any information acquired in the course of representing a client may not be
used to the disadvantage of the client.., absent informed consent by the client.").
192. Strauss, Argument for Autonomy, supra note 143, at 318 (citing Spiegel, The
New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer.Client Decisionmaking and the
Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
1003, 1004).
193. Spiegel, supra note 188, at 49 n.31.
194. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
195. See Quimby, 45 Wash. App. at 181, 724 P.2d at 406.
196. The dilemma arising from Quimby has been anticipated, although it was
predicted to arise not from the practitioner's profit motive directly, but rather from
the efforts of third parties to contain medical costs. See Entin, DGRS, HMOs, and
PPOs: Introducing Economic Issues into the Medical Malpractice Case, 20 FORUM 674
(1985).
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In response they might overdisclose 97 or overdiagnose 9 8 in an
attempt to avoid any lack-of-informed-consent claims.
Although the patient would be nominally informed, he would
be, as a practical matter, barraged with a mind-numbing quan-
tity of unassimilable information rendering any resulting con-
sent meaningless.'9 9
VIII. CONCLUSION
Under the facts in Quimby, Rose Quimby suffered a com-
mon law battery,20 0 an intentional tort no longer actionable
under Washington's statutory formulation for health care
injury causes of action.2 ' Moreover, at least impliedly, the
motive for the act was that of mercantile profit and was delib-
erate and intentional. One cannot hesitate to indict such
behavior by a physician as reprehensible and deserving of pun-
ishment. The holding of Quimby seems both unavoidable and
justified, if difficult to interpret. But the implication of Con-
sumer Protection Act liability for merely negligent,0 2 or even
"[D]efendants will soon be facing juries with the difficult task of
explaining how their medical judgment was not incorrectly influenced by the
new economic pressures imposed upon medical delivery." And: "the
continuing trend of medical liability decisions do nothing but intensify the
impression that physicians will be called upon to utilize every diagnostic tool
available to avoid or at least mitigate liability for failure to diagnose. At the
same time, the Prospective Payment System represents a powerful incentive
to curtain the over-utilization of the very same diagnostic procedures."
Id. at 680.
197. Since whether a fact is "material" will not be known until the question is
presented to a jury, and practitioners will desire to avoid even the remote possibility of
liability under the Consumer Protection Act if they are not indemnified by
malpractice insurance, there is great incentive to misallocate medical resources, i.e.,
physician-hours, disclosing information at best peripherally related to the central
objective of providing the patient with adequate pertinent information enabling him to
render a meaningful decision regarding what shall be done to him.
198. See Comment, Informed Consent in Washington, supra note 77, at 673
(encouragement of defensive medicine and an expanded role for written consent forms
seems likely); Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive
Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939, 942 (1971) (defensive medicine consists of medically
unjustified care provided by the physician for the purpose of reducing the possibility of
a malpractice suit). Unnecessary care includes, of course, unnecessary diagnostic
procedures.
199. As one commentator has indicated, physicians may seek to avail themselves
of the procedural advantages (creation of a presumption of adequate disclosure and
consent) afforded by a written consent form under WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.060 (1987).
See generally Comment, Informed Consent in Washington, supra note 77.
200. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
201. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.030 (1987).
202. Commentators have already apprehended "the most serious ... possibility
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non-negligent failure to secure informed consent seems
unsupportable.
In summary, satisfaction of the elements of a lack-of-
informed-consent claim also satisfies the prongs of the Hang-
man test for a private dispute action under the Consumer Pro-
tection Act. The holding of Quimby requires as an additional
element or prong that the lack of informed consent "relate to
the entrepreneurial aspects of the medical practice."2 3 This
Note has suggested that the entrepreneurial aspects test
devolves into a de facto consideration of profit motive, and
thereby reintroduces a requirement of intent20 4 into Consumer
Protection Act claims within the framework of lack-of-
informed-consent actions. If the reason the consent was not
obtained was for the profit of the health care professional who
had a duty to disclose, then the punitive remedies of the Con-
sumer Protection Act are appropriate and should attach.
Absent the analytical distinction of profit motivation, the
entrepreneurial aspects test is in reality no test at all, and
there is no reliable basis for distinguishing lack-of-informed-
consent claims to which Consumer Protection Act remedies
will attach from those to which they will not. Hence, all lack-
of-informed-consent claims will afford plaintiffs Consumer
Protection Act recoveries in addition to their other available
remedies. Health care providers could protect their personal
financial assets better by intentionally botching procedures
than by negligently failing to disclose.2 °5 This state of the law
does not and cannot make sense.
that informed consent doctrine will supplant traditional malpractice doctrine. In
particular, informed consent represents a vehicle for altering the rule against recovery
for non-negligent failure to diagnose." Comment, Informed Consent in Washington,
supra note 77, at 671. See Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 237, 523 P.2d 211, 216-17
(1970) (doctrine of informed consent allows a patient to recover damages from a
physician despite having received non-negligent medical diagnosis and treatment.).
Of four recently identified "adverse trends" in tort, two are arguably aggravated
by the facial results of Quimby: 1) movement toward no-fault liability, and 2)
explosive growth of pain, suffering, and punitive damages. Of eight recommended
"tort reforms," two may be thwarted by Quimby: 1) retention of fault as a basis of
liability, and 2) limits on non-economic damages. Report of the Tort Policy Working
Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications for the Current Crisis in
Insurance Availability and Affordability, February 1986, quoted in Freeman, Tort Law
Reform: Superfund/RCRA Liability as a Major Cause of the Insurance Crisis, 21 TORT
AND INs. L.J. 517 (1986).
203. Quimby, 45 Wash. App. at 181, 724 P.2d at 406.
204. Commentators have been critical of requiring intent in private Consumer
Protection Act claims. See, e.g., Comment, A Re-Evaluation, supra note 49, at 699.
205. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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With the denial of review by the Washington Supreme
Court on March 4, 1987, Quimby remains the law of the state.
Until such time as the holding is clarified, plaintiffs' attorneys
will have a new theory on which they can, should, and no
doubt will press for increased awards for their clients who
have lack-of-informed-consent claims: Consumer Protection
Act private dispute claims. Under plausible readings of
Quimby, these plaintiffs would appear to have every expecta-
tion of prevailing once their informed consent claim has been
established. Meanwhile, there is precious little that health
care providers can do to insulate themselves from potential
punitive damage awards20 6 against which they are almost cer-
tainly uninsured and uninsurable. °7 It is almost beneath say-
ing that every provider should attempt to procure valid,
written informed consent for every procedure and diagnostic
test as well as an "informed refusal" for every procedure and
test recommended but not accepted by the patient. But until
the courts adopt the test proposed in this Note, application of
the Consumer Protection Act to medical lack-of-informed-con-
sent cases is left in the hands of the individual trial courts.2 °8
Further, the ethical, well-meaning, merely negligent defendant
will continue to be exposed to the same threat of liability in
punitive damages as the most deceitful, reprehensible, and cul-
pable of fraudulent quacks. It is hoped that this condition will
not long endure.
Dr. Carroll Rusk, Jr.
206. Simple mechanisms to accomplish this insulation, at least partially, would be
to set identical fees for alternate procedures when practical, and to offer alternative
procedures that would require the provider himself to refer the patient to another
practitioner and therefore lose income and profits, for example.
207. See supra notes 92 & 165-74 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 22 (Quimby trial court's interpretation of the test).
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